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FRAGMENTATION
Harlan Grant Cohen*
Forthcoming in Fundamental Concepts for International Law: The Construction
of a Discipline (Jean d’Aspremont & Sahib Singh, eds.)

I. Fragmentation Fever
International lawyers can be a nervous bunch. To loosely paraphrase Martti
Koskenniemi, international lawyers often seem torn between starry-eyed
optimism over the good international law can accomplish and hand-wringing
anxiety over the existential threats it faces.1 Listening to international lawyers,
one might hear a story of international law’s powerful potential under constant
threat from rogue, recalcitrant, or opportunistic states, from realism and cynicism,
from ambivalence and apathy. Whether or not international law can overcome
those forces seems to depend on the mood of the lawyer and the moment.
For a brief moment around the turn of the twenty-first century, the source of that
anxiety, the existential threat to international law, was not a state, an actor, even
an idea—it was a concept: “Fragmentation.”2 The proliferation of new
international tribunals and regulatory regimes seemed to put pressure on
international law’s unity, threatening its backers’ united front against doubters and
opportunists. International Court of Justice judges launched into jeremiads.
Conferences were convened. The International Law Commission began a study.
And then, by the end of the first decade of the twentieth-first century, the panic
seemed over. The forces producing fragmentation had not gone away, but
fragmentation fear seems to have.3
This chapter chronicles the rise and fall of the millennial Fragmentation scare and
how it has impacted international legal thought. It examines how the concept and
*
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responses to it structured the millennial field of international law, how fears of
fragmentation were repurposed along the way, where, speculatively, the fear may
have gone, and how and to what extent faith in international law was restored.

II. More judges, more problems
Perhaps ironically, anxiety over Fragmentation was a product of international
law’s success. Threats to the unity of international law are not a new
phenomenon.4 Modern international law (as opposed, for example, to various
earlier conceptions of the Law of Nations) has a largely non-hierarchical structure
and has mostly lacked a single body or authority able to resolve disputes over the
law with finality. International tribunals, to the extent they existed at all, were ad
hoc and limited in their mandates. Enforcement of international law has been
largely horizontal, with participants (e.g., states and national courts) judging each
other’s actions and choosing how to respond. And much of modern international
law has been transactional, built on negotiated obligations between states. Any
and all of these realities could threaten the unity of international law, leading to
both inconsistent interpretations of common obligations and inconsistent “special”
obligations between different groups of states. Concerns about international law’s
fragmentation, whether using that term or not, were from time to time, raised.5
The advent of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in 1922, and its
successor, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held out the possibility of some
greater unification of law and doctrine, but through much of their history, those
courts’ dockets remained small and their jurisdiction limited.
All of that started to change in the mid-1990s. The Cold War was over.
International legal regimes that had been frozen as East and West stared each
other down began to heat up, leading to new international agreements, new
international organizations, and most notably, new international tribunals, some
with considerable power over their respective regimes. The Security Council
created two new international criminal tribunals, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, each with substantial coercive power, specifically, the mandate to
authoritatively apply international criminal law and to try, convict, and punish
individuals for its violation. In 1998, the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court was adopted. The Uruguay Rounds of negotiations over the
4
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade led to the creation of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and a new Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) that
created compulsory, exclusive jurisdiction over trade disputes between WTO
members and a new permanent Appellate Body (AB). A new International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) began work. And these global tribunals
were joined by a series of regional ones and a growing number of ad hoc
investment tribunals. All of a sudden, there were more than a hundred courts and
tribunals operating within different corners of international law.
Concerns about the potential for fragmentation suddenly picked up steam.
Leading the way were ICJ Judges. Judge Shingeru Oda famously questioned the
wisdom of a separate International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.6 In 1997,
former ICJ Judge and President Robert Jennings worried that the proliferation of
courts raised “the danger that international law as a whole will become
fragmented and unmanageable.”7 In 1999, then ICJ Judge and President Stephen
M. Schwebel worried aloud in his annual address to the United Nations that the
proliferation of new international tribunals “might produce substantial conflict
among them, and evisceration of the docket of the International Court of Justice.”8
The following year, his successor, Gilbert Guillaume, invoking “the danger of
fragmentation in the law,” cautioned the United Nations that the proliferation of
tribunals might lead to “forum shopping,” “distort the operation of justice,” “give
rise to serious uncertainty as to the content of the law in the minds of players on
the international stage,” and “ultimately restrict the role of international law in
inter-State relations.”9 Guillaume repeated his concerns a year later, telling the
General Assembly, that “[t]he proliferation of international courts may jeopardize
the unity of international law and, as a consequence, its role in inter-state
relations.”10
A few key early cases suggested these judges might be right to be concerned. The
ICTY, in its first case, Tadic, had arguably split with the ICJ on its ability to
review the Security Council’s decisions,11 holding that it could judge the
6
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legitimacy of its own jurisdiction,12 and rejected the ICJ’s test for state attribution,
adopting a test of overall control13 rather than effective control.14 The European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) had split with the ICJ on the validity of treaty
reservations, holding in Belilos v. Switzerland that the ECtHR could not only
judge the validity of state reservations, something the ICJ had left to the other
state parties, but also that invalid state reservations were severable, leaving the
state bound to the whole treaty, including the portion it had attempted to reserve,
in apparent disagreement with the ICJ.15
The Human Rights Committee
supervising the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights eventually
adopted the ECtHR’s view.16 Others cited the ECtHR’s rejection of territorial
limitations Turkey had placed on that court’s jurisdiction,17 a type of limitation
the ICJ had previously accepted.
Both Schwebel and Guillaume suggested the same solution; other international
courts should refer difficult questions of international law to the ICJ, rather than
decide them themselves. Addressing a conference at New York University
School of Law on the proliferation of international courts and tribunals in 1998,
Georges Abi-Saab, a former ad hoc judge on the ICJ, ICTY and ICTR and a soon
to be judge on the WTO AB, while striking a somewhat less worried tone,
suggested a similar mechanism—using the ICJ as a sort of court of appeals.18
Others outside the international judiciary began to notice the possible implications
of the proliferation of regimes and tribunals as well. A second more neutral
strand of fragmentation discourse focused on proliferation’s systemic effects19
began to converge with the fragmentation concerns voiced by ICJ Judges. The
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law began a project to explore whether
the increasingly complex regimes of international represented a threat to the unity
12
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Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT’L ORG. 207 (2004).
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of international law’s secondary rules.20 The Project on International Court and
Tribunals (PICT) was established in 1997. Partly under its aegis, an influential
conference on the proliferation of international courts and tribunals was held at
the New York University School of Law in 1998.21 Of the articles the conference
produced, four referenced fragmentation in their titles themselves.22 And of
course most notably, following a feasibility study by Gerhard Hafner, “Risks
Ensuing From Fragmentation of International Law,”23 the International Law
Commission (ILC) voted to study the topic, with working groups chaired first by
Bruno Simma and then Martti Koskenniemi considering international law’s
fragmentation.24

III. School’s Out Forever!
Commentators hardly waited for the ILC to complete its work. Over the next few
years, the question of fragmentation exploded, launching myriad articles, projects,
and conferences. What had started as an apparent obsession of ICJ Judges had
become an obsession of the college of international lawyers. As Martti
Koskenniemi suggested, it was hardly surprising that ICJ judges were concerned;
it was their position as arbiters of international legal meaning that was threatened
by the new courts and specialized regimes.25 But fragmentation anxiety spread.
Specialists in trade, investment, human rights, international humanitarian law, and
environmental law worried about the increasing distance between their deepening
fields. Some of this was essentially political. Disagreements over international
20
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law’s obligations were popping up all over the place, between trade and the
environment,26 between trade and the law of the sea, between human rights law
and international humanitarian law,27 between international humanitarian law and
international criminal law,28 between international investment law and
international human rights; concerns about fragmentation were concerns about
who would win in the competition between regimes.
But for some, fragmentation raised the specter long-haunting international
lawyers: the question whether international law was law at all. Observers worried
that disagreements over what international law requires would threaten
international law’s authority and embolden its critics. Dissensus threatened all of
international law. And finally, it was hard to ignore the false nostalgia in
discussions of fragmentation; a sense that the days of the invisible college of
international lawyers were coming to a close, that its members were going their
separate ways, and that while there would be reunions, it would never be the
same.29 (After all, if all that held the invisible college together were shared
norms, what’s left when those are gone?) Fragmentation anxiety was the anxiety
of the postmodern, as Martti Koskenniemi famously explained—the realization
that the carefully ordered world international lawyers had been building was
actually complicated, cluttered, and contested.30
Of course, not everyone agreed that fragmentation was a problem. Jonathan
Charney, one of the first to consider the issue, found more agreement than
disagreement between the proliferating courts and praised what differences there
were as a creative force in international law.31 Rosalyn Higgins, criticized her
predecessors as Presidents of the ICJ for “seek[ing] to re-establish the old order of
things and ignor[ing] the very reasons that have occasioned the new
decentralization.”32
And as part of an influential Michigan Journal of
International Law symposium, Bruno Simma sought to put “Fragmentation in a

26

Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, ¶¶ 180–184, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 8, 1998).
27
Marko Milanovic, Norm Conflict in International Law: Whither Human Rights?, 20 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 69 (2009).
28
Kenneth Anderson, The Rise of Interna- R tional Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended
Consequences, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 331, 349 (2009).
29
Cf. Mario Prost, All shouting the Same Slogans: International Law’s Unities and the Politics of
Fragmentation, 27 FINNISH Y. INT’L L 24-29 (2006).
30
Koskenniemi and Leino, supra note 2.
31
Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?, 271
RECUEIL DES COURS 101 (1998).
32
Rosalyn Higgins, Respecting Sovereign States and Running a Tight Courtroom, 50 ICLQ 122
(2001).
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Positive Light.”33 Simma had already softened the tone of the ILC project by
changing the title to “Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from
the diversification and expansion of international law” to avoid the implication
that fragmentation necessarily meant “risk.”34

IV. Fragmentation of What?
One issue that was never fully answered during this period was what exactly was
fragmenting. In fact, commentators, both positive and negative, seemed to bundle
together a range of different phenomena related to the expansion of international
law. This could only have served to deepen the anxiety as it must have seemed
for some as though everything was spiraling apart into the vacuum.
One might collect the fragmentation concerns raised during the period into three
broad groups: (1) jurisdictional or interpretative fragmentation, (2) regulatory
fragmentation, or (3) normative fragmentation.35 The three bleed into one
another—the presence of one might encourage or reinforce the others—but it is
useful to tease them apart as each raises distinct concerns and solutions.
Jurisdictional or interpretative fragmentation is what primarily worried ICJ
Judges. The proliferation of courts, tribunals, and other interpretative bodies
raised the possibility that each might interpret a single rule or body of law
differently. The ICJ and ICTY might disagree over the attribution of non-state
actor actions to states,36 the ECHR and the ICJ might disagree over rules
regarding reservations to treaties, the ICJ and ITLOS might disagree on the rules
governing maritime delimitation, individual investment tribunals might disagree
with each other over the meaning of common investment treaty terms. Those
international courts and tribunals are in turn competing with governments,
international organizations, and national courts, who each might have their own
interpretations.
Examples might include the disagreements between the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and Israeli Supreme Court over the legality of
33

Bruno Simma, Fragmentation in a Positive Light, 25 Mich. J. Int'l L. 845 (2004).
Id.
35
See Harlan Grant Cohen, From Fragmentation to Constitutionalization, 25 PAC. MCGEORGE
GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 381 (2012); Prost, supra note 29.
36
Compare Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, *204-08 Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 14, 1997) (setting out the “overall control” test) with
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. REP. 14, 64-65 (June 27) (setting out an “effective control” test) and Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb.
and Montenegro) 2007 I.C.J. General List No. 19, *208 (Feb. 26) (reasserting “effective control
test after Tadic).
34
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Israel’s West Bank wall/barrier/fence,37 between the ICJ and the U.S. Supreme
Court over the proper interpretation of the Vienna Convention Consular Relations
in Avena38 and Sanchez-Llamas,39 or between the ICJ and national courts over
sovereign immunity for jus cogens violations. In any given case, multiple of
these interpreters may have a claim to jurisdiction. International actors could be
expected to forum-shop for favorable interpretations, and without a hierarchy of
courts, there may be no definitive way to choose between interpretations. For the
anxious, actors’ ability to choose legal interpretations that suit them could only
lead to disrespect for international law in general. Giving one body the power to
ultimately decide between conflicting interpretations, as suggested by Schwebel,
Guillaume, and others, might appear a natural solution.
But other observers seemed less concerned with interpretive fragmentation than
with the potentially conflicting demands of a growing number of deeper, more
powerful international regulatory regimes. Increasingly, the same conduct might
be governed by different legal regimes, each with their own bodies of rules and/or
logics. Human rights law and international humanitarian law might require
different standards for detentions or lethal targeting. Obligations to comply with
UN Security Council financial sanctions might conflict with European treaty
obligations guaranteeing due process.40 WTO rules protecting patents might
conflict with human rights law requirements to provide access to medicine.41
Trade and investment treaties might block actions required by environmental or
human rights ones. The International Energy Agency might enact policies in
conflict with obligations to decrease emissions under international environmental
law.42 This type of fragmentation requires tools to reconcile inconsistent
obligations—priority rules between different treaties, rules regarding lex specialis
and lex generalis, rules about systemic integration. It is those types of rules,
37

Compare Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 201-03 (July 9) with HCJ 2056/04, *16 Beit Sourik
Village Council v. Government of Israel 58(5) PD 807 [2004] (Isr.) and HCJ 7957/04, *13-14
Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Israel 58(2) PD 393 [2005].
38
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 71 (March 31).
39
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 347-50 (2006).
40
See Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found.
v. Council & Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. ¶ 327.
41
See generally Carmen Otero Garcia-Castrillon, An Approach to the WTO Ministerial
Declaration on the Trips Agreement and Public Health, 5 J. INTL. ECON. L. 212, 212 (2002)
(describing debates over balance of interests in key trade documents); Steve Charnovitz, The Legal
Status of the Doha Declarations, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 207, 207 (2002) (same); James Thuo Gathii,
The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on Trips and Public Health Under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 291, 291 (2002) (same).
42
See Timothy L. Meyer, The Architecture of International Energy Governance, 106 AM. SOC.
INT'L L. PROC. 389 (2012).
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rather than rules about the priority of particular courts or tribunals, that the ILC
eventually chose to focus on in its final recommendations.
Some observers honed in on a third, deeper type of fragmentation, a
fragmentation of norms or legal community. Prosper Weill’s influential essay
worrying about rise of new sources of international law, in particular soft law,
presented an early version of this concern.43 The rapid proliferation and
deepening of varied fields of international law—international human rights law,
humanitarian law, criminal law, investment law, trade law, environmental law—
each with their own institutions was producing a range of new potential sources of
international authority—international judicial decisions, recommendations from
expert bodies, resolutions of international organizations, etc. Did everyone agree
on their relative status as sources of international law? The Netherlands Yearbook
of International Law commissioned a project to investigate whether the growth of
specialized, siloed fields of international law had in fact fragmented
international’s “secondary rules.”44 The authors of that project concluded that
they had not. But others, like Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Gunther Teubner,45 and
Harlan Cohen,46 were less sure, seeing in the growing conflicts between tribunals
and regimes not a disagreement over interpretation or substantive rules, but
instead the growth of alternative subject-specific legal and legitimacy
communities each with their own measuring sticks of international authority.
Human rights law, international criminal law, international investment law, and
international environment law, among others, were becoming distinct legal
communities with differing, perhaps irreconcilable, approaches and priors.
Neither doctrinal tweaks nor resort to secondary rules of international law could
really resolve these conflicts. Generalist international lawyers wishing to hold the
old international law community together are forced from the center to the
preriphery.
Once insiders responsible for maintaining the workings of
international law, these generalist international lawyers become outsiders to the
new more specific legal and legitimacy communities they seek to rein in.

V. De-fragmentation
43

See Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413
(1983).
44
L.A.N.M. BARNHOORN & K.C. WELLENS, DIVERSITY IN SECONDARY RULES AND THE UNITY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (THE HAGUE: NIJHOFF, 1995).
45
Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 5 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004).
46
Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law, Part II: Our Fragmenting Legal Community, 44
NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 1049 (2012).
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During this period, the prospective fragmentation of international law elicited a
wide range of responses. In contrast to those who sought to impose a hierarchy
on international law that might authorize some (for example, ICJ Judges) to
mandate fragmentation out of existence by decree, others extolled the virtues of
fragmentation as a force for contestation within the system, an opening for those
traditionally less powerful to have a greater voice in an often elitist field.47
Individuals had pathways to lawmaking no longer fully blocked by states;
developing states could find fora in which their voice might be more powerful.
Brazil’s ability to broaden the dispute over affordable medicines by eschewing the
WTO in favor of the UN Human Rights Council suggested to some that forum
shopping might be a force for inclusion and justice. At the very least, the choice
of institutions might create the space for a more fulsome international politics in
which complex policy tradeoffs could be debated rather than submerged.
Others suggested managerial approaches. While some disagreements would
endure, much fragmentation could, and likely would, be dealt with through formal
and informal negotiation between regimes.48 WTO members negotiated a
compromise understanding to resolve disputes over intellectual property
protection and access to medicine. The WTO AB opened up its jurisprudence to
allow more space for environmental regulation. Counterinsurgency strategies
would seek to incorporate aspects of both international humanitarian law and
human rights law.49 And greater institutional cooperation would allow some
walls between regimes to come down and working relationships to develop.50
Other responses to fragmentation became organizing concepts in their own right,
including pluralism, conflicts of laws, constitutionalism, and formalism.
Pluralists sought to accommodate or even encourage competition within and over
international law.51 They extolled devices like margins of appreciation,
subsidiarity, and complementarity as means for managing and coordinating, rather
than eliminating, differences in views, and recommended the extension of those
devices to fields beyond human rights law and international criminal law in which
they had developed.52 A related set of approaches looked to conflicts of laws as
47

Barbara Stark, International Law from the Bottom Up: Fragmentation and Transformation, 34
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 687 (2014).
48
MARGARET A. YOUNG, ED., REGIME INTERACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING
FRAGMENTATION (2012).
49
Evan J. Criddle, Proportionality in Counterinsurgency: A Relational Theory, 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1073 (2012).
50
Jeffrey Dunoff, A New Approach to Regime Interaction, in REGIME INTERACTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 48.
51
William W. Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 963 (2004).
52
Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007).

10

both a potential analogy and as a source of techniques for managing
fragmentation.53
While pluralism and conflicts of laws sought to accommodate or manage
fragmentation, constitutionalism sought to overcome it. Constitutionalism saw
hope where others felt nervous.
For constitutionalists, the responses to
fragmentation presented the beginning of an international constitution.54
Substantive and/or procedural norms derived from human rights,55 public law, and
administrative law would unify international law, setting standards and settling
disputes.
For its part, the ILC adopted a different approach: Formalism. Over the course of
its fragmentation study, the ILC made a conscious decision to shift away from
questions about the relationship between different courts and tribunals,56 deciding
it best not to “appoint[] itself as referee ‘in the relationships between
institutions.’”57 As the final report explained, “The issue of institutional
competencies is best dealt with by the institutions themselves.”58 Instead the
focus would be on the relationship between different treaties and obligations. The
Final Report submitted by Martti Koskenniemi reflects those decisions, adopting
a technical approach to fragmentation that relies heavily on the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Declaring international law a system, the
final report focuses on the work that can be done by formal tools such as lex
specialis, lex posterior, lex superior, and systemic integration.59 While some
have criticized the Final Report for failing to grapple with the deep theoretical

53

Ralf Michaels & Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Different Techniques
in the Fragmentation of International Law, in MULTI-SOURCE EQUIVALENT NORMS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2011); Cohen, Finding, Part II,
supra note 46.
54
JEFFREY L. DUNOFF & JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2009); JAN KLABBERS, ANNE PETERS, & GEIR
ULFSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009)
55
Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Cross-Judging: Tribunalization in a Fragmented but
Interconnected Global Order, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 959 (2009).
56
Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Suppl. No. 10, at 237-40,
U.N. Doc. A/ 57/10 (2002).
57
Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple International Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the
Growing Strength of International Law or its Fragmentation?, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 929, 936
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problems raised by fragmentation,60 Koskenniemi has defended a turn towards
formalism and technique as the best approach.61

VI. All Together Now?
And then the fever broke. Fragmentation, once seemingly on the lips of every
international lawyer, was suddenly passé.62 Not that conflicts between regimes or
over international law rules had gone away—on the contrary, they have arguably
only increased, but the anxiety and the energy the term fragmentation once
produced seems to have dissipated. International law seems to have moved on.
What happened?
One interpretation is that, whether or not it succeeded in solving the perceived
problems of fragmentation, the ILC’s technical approach succeeded in sucking the
air out of the fragmentation balloon. Many had been thinking or writing about
fragmentation in anticipation of the ILC’s report. The ILC decision to normalize
fragmentation into a simple matter of interpretation took away an official focal
point around which to debate the more theoretical aspects of the issue. The ILC
essentially cut off the debate by changing the subject.
But the other interpretation is that we’ve simply come to terms with
fragmentation, for now, finding ways to at least manage the conflicts between
norms, rules, and interpretations. International actors have shown an increasing
awareness of the conflicts between them and have in many cases sought to
overcome them. The WTO AB found room for environmental regulation in the
standards of free trade,63 and the WTO parties negotiated space for affordable
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medicines.64 And international courts and tribunals now regularly cite each other
in an effort to work towards common ground.65 Competition between tribunals
and regimes has not gone away, but there does seem to be greater acceptance that
all are part of a common project. Even the ICJ now cites the opinions of other
international courts and tribunals.66
Even where the conflicts haven’t been resolved, attempts have been made to
reconcile them. The Israel Supreme Court has adopted standards for targeting
that seems to draw on both international human rights and international
humanitarian law. The ILC, studying the question of reservations,67 adopted a
view that arguably reconciles the approaches of the ECtHR and ICJ.68
Discussions over the relationship between different regimes and rules have also
grown deeper and clearer. Questions about International Humanitarian Law’s
applicability to Non-International Armed Conflicts have arguably been sharpened
by the encounter with Human Rights even as the two remain in some tension and
competition. Questions about detention and targeting are arguably crisper than
they were a decade ago.

VII. More Law; More Politics?
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If this second interpretation is correct, that increased collisions between
international law regimes has led to greater awareness of conflicts and greater
efforts to work through them, then it suggests a seemingly paradoxical
conclusion: the same proliferation of international regimes, organizations,
institutions, and rules that produced of the original concerns about fragmentation
also succeeded in resolving them. What was arguably most concerning about the
proliferation taking place in the late 1990’s was its obscure and specialized
nature. Lawyers and judges were making sometimes-inconsistent decisions about
rules, obligations, and principles in siloed regimes barely visible to lawyers
outside of them or the general public. What was missing was not just a single
hierarchical institution that could resolve disputes between them, but an effective
space for international politics in which the results of these new regimes could be
debated, weighed, and balanced.
As these regimes have come of age, the space for robust international politics has
grown. As these regimes have deepened and expanded, they have become more
visible outside the small cadre who practice there. Dealing regularly with state
environmental, health, labor, and fiscal policies, trade and investment law can no
longer hide from public view. In some cases, this has forced regimes like trade to
internalize other concerns, bringing more actors with diverse interests into the
internal debates over the regimes rules. In other cases, the regimes have put up
walls to keep out outsiders, but have become focal points for external public
debate, as has arguably been the case in investment law. The deepening and
expansion of these fields of international law has also increased contact between
them. Lawyers and administrators are much more likely to meet both informally
or formally than twenty years ago.
In a sense, paradoxically, the problems associated with fragmentation may be
most pronounced when the conflicting regimes are modest and contained, their
interactions with each other weak and intermittent. Greater power, relevance, and
visibility for these proliferating regimes have created more room for contestation.
Proliferation solves proliferation. Fragmentation hasn’t gone away. Politics have
begun to emerge.
Of course, the space for robust international politics remains inconsistent and
small. Some areas have too much; others too little. But its emergence seems a
natural outgrowth of the same forces generating fragmentation and a potential
counterweight.
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VIII. A Shattered Mirror
A danger, an opportunity, passé, a cliché, destabilizing, empowering, destructive,
creative: Depending on whom you ask, fragmentation has meant any and all of
these for international law. The concept of fragmentation has been a mirror
reflecting international lawyers’ perception of themselves, their field, its prospects
for the future. The story of international’s law’s potential fragmentation is the
story of international lawyers. At its best, discussions of fragmentation have
been an opportunity for self-awareness and reflection, a chance to think about
what the system of international law has become and what it could be; at its worst,
they have been a source of lawyerly self-obsession. In a non-hierarchical, dare
we say “fragmented,” system, in which international law is often as much of
function of its participants as it is of any institution, the two may be very hard to
disentangle.
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